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PLAYING HIDE AND SEEK: HOW TO PROTECT VIRTUAL
PORNOGRAPHERS AND ACTUAL CHILDREN O N THE INTERNET

W

ITH its ruling in Ashcrop v. Free Speech Coalition,' the Supreme Court

cloaked virtual child pornography with First Amendment protect i ~ n .In~ so doing, it rejected all of the government's contentions concerning the harm to actual children that virtual pornography may
engender.3 In particular, the Court rejected the government's position
that a ban o n virtual pornography is necessary because of the difficulty of
establishing that a n image depicted a n actual, rather than a virtual child.4
Instead, the Court suggested that creating a market for virtual pornography is not only innocuous to actual children, but could actually protect
them.5
This Article considers the Supreme Court's suggestion and recommends a mechanism to regulate the virtual pornography market in a manner that balances the rights of virtual pornographers with the prosecution
of actual child pornographers. Part I1 traces the events leading u p to the
Free Speech decision, commencing with the enactment of the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA).6 Part I11 discusses the Free Speech
opinion and the post-Free Speech cases.' Part IV examines the PROTECT

* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. B.S., 1977, State
University of New York at Albany; J.D., 1980, St. John's University School of Law.
1. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
2. See id. at 258 (discussing holding in context of plausible First Amendment
violations that may arise with broadly written language).
3. See id. at 236 ("While the Government asserts that the images can lead to
actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and indirect."). A b
sent causation, the government maintained that child pornography rests outside
the First Amendment's protection because the government did not consider pornographic images to be valuable speech. See id. (recounting government's arguments for why Court should uphold law). The Court, however, considered the
government's categorization of child pornography as incongruent with previous
holdings. See id. (highlighting government's misapplication of holding in New Yurk
v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
4. See id. at 254 (describing government's argument as "implausible").
5. See id. (reasoning that few pornographers would illegally abuse actual children if virtual images would suff~cientlyfeed an interested market).
6. 18 U.S.C. 55 2251-2260 (1994 & Supp. V 1999). For a discussion of the
events leading up to the Free Speech ruling commencing with the enactment of the
Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (CPPA), see infia notes 11-20 and accompanying text.
7. For a discussion of the Free Speech case and post-Free Speech cases, see infra
notes 21-80 and accompanying text.
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Acts-the legislative response to the Supreme Court's d e c i ~ i o n .Part
~ V
concludes that regulation of the virtual pornography industry is the most
effective method of protecting children and free speech rights.1° Building
upon existing statutory record-keeping provisions and adapting them to
virtual pornography can best accomplish such regulation.

Congress brought the issue of virtual pornography to the forefront
with its enactment of the CPPA.ll Seeking to be proactive, Congress's ban
on pornographic images of virtual children was based on congressional
findings of a compelling state interest in protecting actual children from
all child pornography, whether it depicted real or virtual children.12 The
legislative history of the CPPA was premised on thirteen findings, including that pedophiles use images of child pornography to seduce actual children by reducing their inhibitions and desensitizing them to sexual
conduct.13 Congress found that both real and virtual child pornography
8. Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT), 18 U.S.C. fj 2252A (2000 & Supp. 111 2003).
For further discussion, see infia notes 81-100 and accompanying text.
9. For a discussion of the PROTECT Act, see infia notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of suggestions for regulating virtual pornography, see inp a notes 109-66 and accompanying text.
11. "Before 1996, Congress defined child pornography as the type of depictions at issue in Ferber, images made using actual minors." Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 241 (2002). Congress first passed legislation concerning
child pornography with the Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act
of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95225, 92 Stat. 7 (1977) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2251-2253 (1978)). This Act focused on child pornography that was obscene
and commercially produced. See id. (discussing purpose of Act). The Supreme
Court's 1982 ruling in New Ymk v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), banning all pornography using actual children regardless of whether it was obscene, helped lead to
the next chapter in the legislative attempts to ban child pornography-the Child
Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98292, 98 Stat. 204 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (1984)), and the Child Sexual Abuse and
Pornography Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-628 § 2, 100 Stat. 3510 (1986) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251 (1986)). See generally John P. Feldmeier, Close
Enough for Government Wmk: An Examination of Congressional E f f i to Reduce the Government's Burden of Proof in Child Pornography Cases, 30 N. KY. L. REV. 205 (2003)
(tracing historically relevant congressional responses to federal common law in
light of expanding criminality of child pornography).
In 1986 the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography issued its final
report, which examined the problems with the existing child pornography legislation and suggested changes in the law to better protect children. See generally
UNITEDSTATES
DEP'T.OF JUSTICE, A~T'YGEN.COMM.ON PORNOGRAPHY,
FINALREP.
(1986) [hereinafter FINALREPORT].The report led to the enactment of the Child
Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat.
4181 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251A-2252 (1988)).
12. See CHILDPORNOGRAPHY
PREVENTION
ACT.OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104358, at
2 (1996).
13. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No 104208, 110 Stat.
3009 (1996).
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whets the appetite of molesters by fueling their fantasies a n d stimulating
their desire to molest a n actual child.14 Moreover, Congress determined
that child pornography prosecutions would be increasingly difficult as
images of virtual children become indistinguishable from actual victims of
child pornography.15 Specifically, Congress found that "new photographic and computer imaging technologies, make it possible to produce
by electronic, mechanical, or other means, visual depictions of what appear to be children engaging in sexually explicit conduct that are virtually
indistinguishable to the unsuspecting viewer" from images of actual
children.16
In recognition of the advances being made in technology a n d the Internet, the CPPA expanded the definition of child pornography to encompass "any visual depiction" that "is m appears to be, a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct."" T h e CPPA contained a n affirmative defense
allowing the producers of pornography to establish that the pornography
was produced using adults.18 T h e ban on virtual pornography created a
wealth of commentarylg and a split between the circuitsz0 that was ultimately resolved by the United States Supreme Court.
14. See CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY
PREVENTION
ACTOF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104358, at
2.
15. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2260 (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (noting CPPA definition of criminal exploitation of children also includes youthful-looking adult
actors).
16. CHILDPORNOGRAPHY
PREVENTION
ACT OF 1995, S. REP. NO. 104358, at 2
(reporting relative ease with which sexual abuse of children can occur with increasingly powerful technological advances). See also Samantha L. Friel, Porn by Any
Other Name? A Constitutional Alternative to Regulating "Victimless" Computer Generated
Pornography, 32 VAL.U. L. REV. 207, 223 (1997) (presenting example of how computer programmer could splice child's image with adult's image to create pornographic picture without real child participation).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8) (B) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (emphasis added).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (1994 & Supp. V 1999) (discussing CPPA's affirmative defense).
19. See generally Amy Adler, Inverting the First A m a d m a t , 149 U. PA.L. REV.921
(2001) (discussing child pornography and its effect on First Amendment analysis);
Daniel S. Armaugh, The Fate of the Child Pornography Act of 1996: Virtual Child Pornography: Criminal Conduct or Protected Speech, 23 CvlDozo L. REV 1993 (2002) (finding
causal link between visual depictions of sexual conduct and emotional and physical
damage to both depicted and nondepicted children); Debra D. Burke, The
Criminaliration of Virtual Child Pornography: A Constitutional Question, 34 h v . J . ON
LEGIS.439 (1997) (discussing whether child pornography is protected speech);
Friel, supra note 16, (proposing rebuttable presumption that image depicting child
in sexual activity is child pornography whether child is virtual or actual); Belinda
Tiosavljevic, A Field Day for Child Pornographers and Pedophiles if the Ninth Circuit Gets
Its Way: Striking down the Constitutional and Necessary Child Pornography Prevention Act
of 1996, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 545 (2001) (discussing CPPA and Ninth Circuit's decision in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999)); Matthew K
Wegner, Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Why Traditional Free Speech Doctrine Suppmts
Anti-ChiId-Pornography Regulations in Virtual Reality, 85 MINN.L. REV. 2081 (2001)
(arguing that national obscenity standard regulates virtual child pornography).
20. Four Circuits upheld the CPPA. See United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394,
411 (5th Cir. 2001) (affirming conviction of defendant who knowingly
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A. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition
In 2002, the United States Supreme Court decided Free Speech and, in
a 6 3 decision, struck down the CPPA's ban on pornography using virtual
children, ruling that the CPPA's "appears to be" language was overbroad
and unconstitutional under the First
The majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy stated that the harm to actual children,
which is the premise of the ban on child pornography, is missing when a
virtual child is depicted.22 Moreover, in rejecting the government's argument, the Court reasoned that the possibility that virtual pornography
might whet the appetite of child molesters was too remote to support an
abridgement of constitutionally protected speech.23
The majority also rejected the government's position that the CPPA
~ ~contrast,
serves to eliminate the market for actual child p ~ r n o g r a p h y .In
the Court stressed the reverse-that allowing virtual pornography could in
fact protect children by drying up the market of actual child pornography.
"If virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal
images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing actual children if fictional, computerized images would suffice."25 The Court also
rejected the government's claim that, with advances in computer technology, it will be increasingly difficult to distinguish between actual and virdownloaded and transmitted pornographic images of children from computer at
place of employment), vacated by, Fox v. U.S., 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); United States
v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912, 922-23 (4th Cir. 2000) (concluding that "appears to be"
language of CPPA remains constitutionally welldefined to substantiate conviction
of defendant), vacated by, Mento v. United States, 535 U.S. 1014 (2002); United
States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645, 650-53 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing defendant's
failure to prove CPPA language is sufficiently vague or overbroad); United States v.
Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 69-70 (1st Cir. 1999) (reasoning that CPPA falls outside constitutionally-protected speech and that CPPA's definition of child pornography is
"adequately precise."). The Ninth Circuit found the CPPA to be invalid on its face.
See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1091 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding
that CPPA language violates First Amendment because of insufficient compelling
government interest).
21. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 258 (2002) (d'ISCUSSing holding).
22. See id. at 250-52 (discussing Court's reasoning).
23. See id. at 253-54 ("First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when
the government seeks to control thought or to j u s q its laws for that impermissible
end.").
24. See id. at 254 (rejecting government's argument as "implausiblen due to
government's false assumption that virtual images would incentivize criminal
activity) .
25. Id.

Heinonline - - 50 Vill. L. Rev. 90 2005

tual p o r n ~ g r a p h y .It~stressed
~
that protected speech cannot be limited as
a means of suppressing unlawful speech.27
In addition, the majority noted that the CPPA's affirmative defense,
which shifts from the government the burden of proving an image depicted only adults, only applied to producers and distributors of pornogra~~
the
phy and left possessors of pornography ~ n p r o t e c t e d .Moreover,
affirmative defense did not protect individuals who created pornographic
images solely by computer; resulting in a complete ban on virtual
porn~graphy.~~
Justice O'Connor, concurring in part and dissenting in part, agreed
that the "appears to be" language in the CPPA was overbroad because it
could be used to infringe on images of youthful looking adults, but she
would have upheld the ban on virtual child pornography that is "virtually
~~
the crux of
indistinguishable fromn actual child p ~ r n o g r a p h y .Rejecting
the majority's rationale, Justice O'Connor found that virtual pornography
whets the appetite of molesters who may then use the virtual images to
seduce young children.31 Moreover, Justice O'Connor stressed the "serious concernn that actual child pornographers may evade prosecution by
claiming that an image was computer-generated.32 She agreed with the
majority that the "language was not narrowly tailored," and suggested the
"virtually indistinguishable from" language would better keep with the language used in the legislative findings.33 Similarly, in his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas noted that should technology reach the point that the
government is unable to distinguish an image of actual from virtual pornography-and therefore unable to prosecute-regulation of the latter
would be permissible, perhaps with an affirmative defense that would meet
the majority's concerns.34
26. See id. at 254-55 (reasoning that First Amendment forbids criminalization
of constitutionally protected speech because of "mere resemblance" to unprotected speech).
27. See id. (discussing scope of First Amendment protection).
28. See id. at 255 (discussing evidentiary difficulties of affirmative defense).
29. See id. at 255-56 (highlighting insufficiencies of affirmative defense where
defendants can prove they did not harm children through image production).
30. See id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concumng) (stressing danger in distribution of virtual images).
31. See id. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's
holding). Justice O'Connor heavily relies on the congressional findings that correlate virtual images to sexual predation of children. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing congressional findings of CPPA).
32. See id. (O'Connor, J., concumng) (equating available defense with "reasonable" means through which criminal could circumvent culpability). Justice
O'Connor's argument focuses on the reasonable probability of sexual predators
evading accountability for molestation through increasingly sophisticated technology. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (assuming that criminal behavior will go
unpunished due to eventually successful defense).
33. Id. at 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
34. See id. at 259-60 (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Justice Thomas's
concern for evolution of technology).
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed with Justice
O'Connor that the government had a compelling interest in protecting
children from the harm of sexual abuse, and that technological advances
will soon make it nearly impossible for the government to protect children
from sexual abuse.35 The Chief Justice found that the CPPA could have
been interpreted to reach only what was previously unprotected speech.36
According to the Chief Justice, the CPPA would only ban hardcore pornography involving actual sexual activity between youthful looking adult
actors, not mere suggestions of sexual activity that are advertised or promoted as child porr~ography.~'Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist
noted that Congress intended for the CPPA only to reach those computergenerated images that are easily mistaken for pictures of actual children
engaging in sexual conduct.38 The CPPA proscribed images that were virtually indistinguishable from pictures of actual children, not depictions of
Shakespearian tragedies, as the majority purported.3g

B. Post-Free Speech Cases
Since the 2002 Free Speech ruling, the government's fears of difficulty
in prosecuting purveyors of child pornography have been, in great measure, borne out. First, a number of defendants who were convicted under
pre-Free Speech jury instructions that defined child pornography as including images that "appear to be" minors have had their convictions over35. See id. at 267-68 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Turner Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 195 (1997)).
36. See id. at 269 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 773-74 (1982) finding CPPA could be interpreted to only ban "hard core
of child pornographyn).
37. See id. at 269-70 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (same).
38. See id. at 270-71 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (discussing CPPA's legislative history and congressional intent behind Act).
39. See id. at 270 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority opinion). In addition, the Chief Justice noted that actual movie producers never felt
the chill of protected speech that the majority claimed would occur from the CPPA
as evidenced by the Best Picture Oscars garnered by the films noted by the majority. See id. at 272 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (noting Best Picture nominations for
"American Beauty" and "Traffic"). Finally, according to the Chief Justice, the
CPPA's prohibition on advertising and promoting did not reach any further than
the "sordid business of pandering" that was already unprotected by the First
Amendment. Id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Ginzberg v. United
States, 383 U.S. 463, 467 (1966)). The majority read this provision too broadly,
according to the Chief Justice, because it would not reach a person who possesses
protected materials. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Agreeing with Justice
O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested that the provision could be constitutionally limited by requiring that a possessor know the material contains images of
real minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct or virtually indistinguishable computer-generated images. See id. at 271 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (offering alternative interpretation of CPPA).
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turned and have received acquittals40or new trials.41 Thus, in United States
v. E l l y ~ o n , ~the
* Fourth Circuit held that the government was required to
prove that the images found on the defendant's computer were of actual
children, and the jury instructions could have led the jury to convict for
possession of constitutionally protected material^.^^ In finding that retrial
rather than acquittal was appr0priate,4~the Fourth Circuit acknowledged
that there "is no suggestion whatsoever that . . . the images are computer
generated."45 Nevertheless, the court found the jury instructions to be
erroneous based on the government's expert witness who testified that it is
possible to "completely construct an image of a young boy* by computer
t e ~ h n o l o g y .The
~ ~ court noted that because the images were not included
in the appellate record, they were unable to make their own assessment of
the authenticity of the images.47 As will be discussed below, the admission
of the pictures into evidence had tactical s i g n i f i c a n ~ e . ~ ~
Second, as Justice O'Connor predicted, defendants have moved
to have indictments dismissed or convictions overturned because of
the government's failure to prove that they "knowinglyn possessed
~ example, in United States u.
actual child p ~ r n o g r a p h y . ~For
40. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1228 (D.N.M. 2002)
(acquitting defendant on one of four counts relating to receipt of pornographic
images because of government's failure to satisfy their burden of production).
41. See United States v. Ellyson, 326 F.3d 522,530 (4th Cir. 2003) (noting new
trials granted in some cases due to jury instructions based on "appears to ben language); United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1063 (11th Cir. 2002) (same);
United States v. Hilton, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4208, *19-20 (D. Me. March 20,
2003) (same).
42. 326 F.3d 522 (4th Cir. 2003).
43. See id. at 522.
44. See id. at 535. Defendant argued that he should receive a judgment of
acquittal on the grounds of insufficient evidence of shipment of child pornography across state lines. See id. (outlining defendant's argument for acquittal).
45. See id. at 535 (citing Richardson, 304 F.3d at 1064).
46. Id. at 531.
47. See id. (highlighting court's inability to assess authenticity of pictures). In
contrast, in Richardson, a new trial was avoided by appellate review of the images
that demonstrated they were of actual children. See Richardson, 304 F.3d at 1061.
48. See, e.g., United States v. Pabon-Cruz, 255 F. Supp. 2d 200, 206 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting significance of "quantity, nature, and organization of the child pornography" to appellate record). For a further discussion of the Pabon-Cruz case,
see inpa notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., United States v. Slanina, 359 F.3d 356 (5th Cir. 2004) (demonstrating situation where defendant moved for dismissal or acquittal); United States
v. Tanner, 66 Fed. Appx. 449 (4th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Hall, 312
F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2002) (same); Richardson, 304 F.3d at 1061 (same); PabonCrur, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 200 (same); United States v. Sims, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1222
(D.N.M. 2002) (same); United States v. Dean, 231 F. Supp. 2d 382 (D. Me. 2002)
(same); United States v. Oakes, 224 F. Supp. 2d 296 (D. Me. 2002) (same); Tad
Dickens, Guilty Plea in Child Porn Case May be Altered; Man Asks Roanoke Judge to Let
Him Withdraw Plea, ROANOKETIMES& WORLDNEWS,July 8, 2002, at C1 (noting
impact of Free Speech case on child pornography prosecution), avaikbk at 2002 WL
24045079.
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R e i l Z ~the
, ~ ~defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea of receiving child
pornography on the grounds that the allocution was insufficient because it
did not state that the defendant knew the images he received were of actual minors.51 The court granted the motion in light of the Free Speech
ruling.52 The court melded the Supreme Court's earlier opinion in United
States v. X-citement Video:3 which mandated that the government prove that
a defendant "knowingly" possess a visual depiction of a minor, with the Free
~ ~ not only must the govSpeech protection of virtual p ~ r n o g r a p h y .Thus,
ernment prove that an image is of an actual child, it must prove that the
defendant knew it was not of a virtual
Defendants have seized on
the CPPA and its legislative findings to argue that they had no way of
knowing whether an image was virtual or actual, and therefore, the government failed to establish the requisite mens re^.^^
In contrast to the Reilly decision, one federal district court refused to
allow a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in a post-Free Speech case in
which the defendant asserted he could not "know" the image was of an
actual
The court reasoned that the defendant was aware of the
government's burden, yet voluntarily pled guilty-in United States v. Marc
~ Nevertheless,
.
~
~in dicta that proved to be portentous of future cases,
the court noted:
[A]n individual who simply possesses or receives images of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct may not even consider,
much less know, whether the images depict actual children or
are the product of computer technology; indeed, such nuances
as to origin seemingly would be irrelevant to the viewer if the two
50. 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19564 (2002) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2002).
51. See id. at *5-7 (stating reasons for defendant's request to withdraw guilty
plea).
52. See id. at *18.
53. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
54. See id. at 465; see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 256
(2002) (establishing burden of proof for child pornography prosecutions).
55. Since the Free Speech ruling, some disagreement among the courts has surfaced as to whether defendants must actually know an image is of a real child or
whether a belief is sufficient. Compare United States v. Tynes, 58 M.J.704, 706-07
(A. Ct. Crim. App. 2003) (requiring that defendant present evidence that minors
in depictions were computer-generated as affirmative defense), with United States
v. Pabon-Cruz, 255 F. Supp. 2d 200, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (requiring proof that
defendant knew images were made of actual, rather than virtual, children to s u p
port criminal conviction for possession of child pornography).
56. See, e.g., Pabon-Crur, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (noting defendant's argument
that "the evidence was insufficient to prove that he knew that the photographs
contained images of actual children and that such knowledge was a required element" to sustain child pornography conviction).
57. United States v. Marcus, 239 F. Supp. 2d 277, 284 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting
district court's refusal to permit withdrawal of guilty plea).
58. 239 F. Supp. 2d 277, 281-84 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
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types of presentation are, o r become as technology improves,
indisting~ishable.~~
T h e Marcus court's prediction was confirmed. Until recently, all
courts have rejected defense assertions that the Free Speech ruling mandates
that the government either provide the identity of the children portrayed
in pornographic images o r supply expert testimony that the images are of
actual children.60 Courts have ruled that such expert testimony is not required because, as the Tenth Circuit stated in United States v. Kimh,61
"Ijluries are still' capable of distinguishing between real and virtual
imagesn6*
In May 2004, however, the First Circuit in United States v. H i l t ~ mann~~
dated that the government introduce evidence, in addition to the images, to
prove the children depicted were
The court indicated that such
evidence could constitute testimony by a computer graphics expert that
the images were not virtual.65 Significantly, the court specifically rejected
o n e type of expert testimony widely used in other cases in which, applying
the Tanner Scale of physical development, the expert testifies that the
images portray a child rather than a n adult.66 The Hilton court noted that
a virtual pornographer would seek to create images that "would be amenable to expert testimony under the Tanner Scale," and therefore a n expert
would not necessarily be able to tell if the child portrayed was real or virt ~ a l . ~Accordingly,
'
the court vacated the defendant's child pornography
59. See id. at 283. In other cases, the failure to directly appeal pre-Free Speech
convictions has limited some defendants to establishing their actual innocence of
the child pornography charges, which, to date, no defendant has been able to do.
See, e.g., United States v. Dean, 231 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (D. Me. 2002) (noting
failure to appeal convictions has hindered ability to establish innocence); United
States v. Oakes, 224 F. Supp. 2d 296, 300-01 (D. Me. 2002) (same).
60. See, e.g., Unites States v. Kimler, 335 F.3d 1132, 1142 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting expert testimony); United States v. Deaton, 328 F.3d 454, 456 (8th Cir.
2003) (same); United States v. Hall, 312 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2002) (same).
61. 335 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2003).
62. Id. at 1142.
63. 363 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 2004).
64. See id. at 64 (discussing evidence requirement).
65. See id. at 65 n.6 (noting that direct evidence of child's identity would also
s&ice).
66. See id. at 60. The Tanner scale looks at breast and genital development as
a means of assessing the age of the person depicted. See id.
67. Id. at 66. The Hilton court noted:
We find more commonsensical a proposition leading to the contrary inference that someone manufacturing images to look like children will
try-and with sufficient technology will manage-to produce images that
would be amenable to expert analysis under the Tanner Scale. Whatever
parameters of body proportion, growth and development serve as signs of
age under the Tanner Scale, those parameters will be mimicked by the
virtual pornographer-whether by design or as a byproduct of the goal of
realism. What a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt demands is
evidence that the indicators of youth apparent to the untrained eye belong to an actual child. Accordingly, we find the government's contenH e i n o n l i n e - - 50 V i l l .
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conviction, notwithstanding that thousands of images were found on the
defendant's computer.68
Hilton is the first case to require evidence beyond the images to establish that the defendant knowingly possessed child pornography. With it
comes an explicit acknowledgment that technology may have reached a
point that juries will not be able to distinguish real from virtual without
, ~ ~may well be the
guidance. While other courts have criticized H i l t ~ nthis
first indication of what Justice Thomas noted in Free Speech that, should
technology reach the point that the government is unable to distinguish
an image of actual from virtual pornography, regulation of the latter
would be p e r r n i ~ s i b l e . ~ ~
The Free Speech ruling has had other significant trial strategy implicathe defendant, who
tions. For example, in United States v. Pabon-Cr~z,~~
had been found guilty of receiving and distributing child pornography,
moved for a judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence that he
knew the images were of actual children.7* The court denied the motion
because the defendant had stipulated that the images were of actual children.73 In the alternative, the defendant moved for a new trial based on
the prejudicial effect of the admission of the pornographic images found
on the defendant's computer.74 The court similarly rejected the request,
finding that the photographs were "extremely relevant" to the defendant's
claim that he did not know the images were of actual children.75
These cases demonstrate that the. government's fears of the difficulty
in prosecuting pumeyors of child pornography are real and growing. A p
pellate courts have reversed convictions, some without the opportunity of
retrial, and set aside guilty pleas. Yet, at this point no jury has acquitted a
tion that Dr. Ricci [(the government's expert witness)] presented
sufficient evidence to prove that the children represented were real
unavailing.
Id.

68. See id. at 60. Significantly, the government introduced only seven images.
See id. at 60. Hilton had a convoluted procedural history commencing with the
defendant's arrest in 1997 as his was one of the first cases to contest the constitutionality of the CPPA. See id. (emphasizing importance of case).
69. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Holze, 2004 Wisc. App. LEXIS 383, *18 (Wis. Ct.
App. May 4, 2004) (criticizing Hilton case).
70. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 259 (2002) (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("[Ilf technological advances thwart prosecution of 'unlawful
speech,' the Government may well have a compelling interest in bamng or otherwise regulating some narrow category of 'lawful speech' in order to enforce effectively laws against pornography made through the abuse of real children.").
71. 255 F. Supp. 2d 200 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
72. See id. at 204 (providing example of implication of Free Speech ruling).
73. See id.; see also united States v. Tanner, 66 Fed. Appx. 449, 450 (4th Cir.
2003).
74. See Pabon-Crug 255 F. Supp. 2d at 213.
75. See id.

H e i n o n l i n e - - 5 0 V i l l . L. R e v .

96 2 0 0 5

defendant on the basis that he was ignorant that the pornographic images
were of real children.76
Trial strategy continues to evolve. If defendants d o not stipulate that
the images are of actual children, the veracity of their claimed ignorance
of the photographs' authenticity will put the images into the jury's hands.
Most defendants vigorously object to the introduction of the images into
evidence, cognizant of the effect they will have on the jury. Similarly,
where the appellate courts have had access to the images, most have u p
held pornography convictions, even under pre-Free Speech jury instruct i o n ~ Surely,
. ~ ~ however, given the Free Speech ruling, defendants will weigh
much more closely the decision to stipulate as to the authenticity of pornographic images so as to put the Government to its proof. Now, with at
least one circuit requiring expert testimony of a picture's veracity, stipulations surely will diminish and battles of experts surely will increase.
What can be done to protect actual children? The Free Speech Court
rejected outright some of the government's arguments for a ban on virtual
pornography, yet left the door open for new legislati~n.'~Congress responded with the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, otherwise known as the
PROTECT Act.79 The following section describes those provisions relating to the virtual pornography problem.80

IV. THEPROTECT ACT
The congressional findings in support of the PROTECT Act are in
direct response to the Free Speech ruling. The thrust of the legislative findings is that prosecutors are being hampered in their ability to prosecute
child pornographer^.^^ The rationale for this inability, however, differs
radically from earlier findings. In 1996, congressional findings linked that
inability to prosecute to advancements in technology that made "it possible to produce by electronic, mechanical, or other means visual depictions
of what appear to be children . . . that are virtually indistinguishable from
76. See generally Feldmeier, supra note 11 (noting no jury has acquitted based
on lack of knowledge defense).
77. See United States v. Richardson, 304 F.3d 1061, 1063 (11th Cir. 2002)
(providing example).
78. See generally Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 259 (2002)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing possibility of new legislation).
79. 18 U.S.C. !j2252A (2000 & Supp. 111 2003).
80. See id. (emphasizing that main thrust of Act was to establish a nationwide
"AMBER Alert."). The discussion that follows highlights those sections of the
PROTECT Act relevant to this Article and is not meant as an exhaustive descrip
tion of the Act.
81. See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 10&21,501, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) [hereinafter Congressional Findings].
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actual . . . ~ h i l d r e n . "In
~ ~stark contrast, the new congressional findings
concede "there is no substantial evidence that any of the child pornography images being traff~ckedtoday were made other than by the abuse of
real ~ h i l d r e n . "Because
~~
of the Free Speech ruling, however, Congress
found that many defendants have suggested that they did not know the
images they possessed were of actual children, rather than virtual child ~ - e n Moreover,
.~~
the new congressional findings stated that technology
does exist "to disguise depictions of real children to make them unidentifiable and to make depictions of real children appear computer-generated."85 It found further that "technology will soon exist, if it does not
already, to computer generate realistic images of children."s6
Based on these findings, the PROTECT Act amended existing child
pornography laws contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) to define child
pornography as including images that are "indistinguishable from" that of
a "minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct."87 In a direct nod to Justice O'Connor, Congress defined the term "indistinguishable" to mean a
depiction that is "virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such
that an ordinary person viewing the depiction would conclude that the
depiction is of an actual minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct."88
To fit within Free Speech's mandate, the definition expressly excludes depictions "that are drawings, cartoons, sculptures, or paintings depicting minors or adults."89
The PROTECT Act also amended the CPPA's affirmative defense that
the Free Speech Court found too narrow. First, Congress extended the af82. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,100 Stat.
3009 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. 5 2251 (1996)).
83. Congressional Findings, supra note 81, 5 501(7).
84. See id.
85. See id., 5 501 (5).
86. Id.
87. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(8)(B) (2000 & Supp. 111 2003).
88. Id. 5 2256(11). See generally Congressional Findings, supra note 81,
5 502(c) (amending definition of "indistinguishable" under 5 2256(11)).
89. 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(11). See generally Congressional Findings, supra note 81,
5 502(c). The PROTECT Act also expanded the pandering provision struck down
by the Free Speech ruling to punish anyone who:
[Aldvertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the mails,
or in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects the
belief. . . that the material or purported material is, or contains-(i) an
obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct.
18 U.S.C. 5 2252A(a)(3)(B). This section has been attacked as unconstitutional
because of the "purported materials" provisions. See Letter on S. 151 from Laura
W. Murphy, Director, ACLU, & Marvin J. Johnson, Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to
Senator Patrick J. Leahy (Feb. 5, 2003) [hereinafter ACLU Letter], auailabb at
http://www.aclu.org/Privacy/Privacy.cfm?ID=l1806&c=252http://www.aclu.org/
Privacy/Privacy.~fm?ID=ll806&~=252.
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firmative defense beyond producers a n d distributors to those who possess
child p o r n ~ g r a p h y .Secondly,
~~
the affirmative defense allows defendants
t o prove that the images were created completely by computer graphics.g1
Congress also amended the record-keeping requirements of producers o f p o r r ~ o g r a p h y .T~h~e original requirements were enacted t o protect
minors from being used i n pornographic films and visual depictions by
requiring producers t o ascertain the ages o f t h e actors employed, keep
records o f this information a n d affix a statement t o all copies of pornographic materials as to where the records could b e found.g3 I t required
that "[w] hoever produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, videotape,
o r o t h e r matter which . . . contains o n e or m o r e visual depictions . . . of
actual sexually explicit conduct," shall create a n d maintain records that
validate that minors were n o t used.g4 T h e original provisions defined
90. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2252A(c) (delineating afXrmative defenses). See generally
id. § 2252A (a) (5) (B) (expanding federal prohibition against child pornography
to those who merely possess such materials).
91. See id. 5 2252A(c). CPPA's -rmative defense was limited to establishing
that adults were used. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255
(2002) (noting government's interpretation that CPPA shifted burden to accused
to prove their speech was lawful). It does not extend, however, to images of
morphed children. See id. at 256 (noting "the affirmative defense provides no protection to persons who produce speech by using computer imaging, or through
other means that do not involve the use of adult actors who appear to be minors").
But cf: 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(c) (providing &rrnative defense if child pornography
was produced without actual minors).
In addition, the PROTECT Act creates a new crime of obscene child pornography that provides for harsher penalties than ordinary obscenity. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1466A. Under the new statute, penalties are imposed on any person who "knowingly produces, distributes, receives, or possesses with intent to distribute" either
an obscene depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct or any image of a minor engaging in "graphic bestiality, sadistic or masochistic abuse," or
any form of sexual intercourse. See id. 5 1466A(a)(1)-(2) (A). Furthermore, any
material that "lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" shall also
be subject to a reprimand. See id. § 1466A(a)(2) (B). The statue further provides
that " [i]t is not a required element of any offense under this section that the minor
depicted actually exist." Id. 5 1466A(c). Much controversy exists over this new
section because it does not require that a depiction is deemed obscene under the
prevailing constitutional principles. See Feldmeier, supra note 11, at 208, 217;
ACLU Letter, supra note 89. This new obscenity crime follows the suggestion of
the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, which is that the best
approach in addressing child pornography is through obscenity laws, because
"99-100 percent of all child pornography would be found to be obscene by most
judges andjuries." 149 CONG.REC. S2573-02, S2580 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy) (quoting National Center for Missing and Exploited Children's answer to written questions submitted after Congressional hearing).
92. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2257 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
93. See id. (listing requirements); see also, 18 U.S.C. § 2257(b) (2000 & Supp.
I11 2003) (mirroring CPPA's requisite recording of performers' ages); id.
§ 2257(e) (1) (mandating similar obligation, as that under CPPA, to attach notice
on all pornographic materials identifying location of all records on performers).
94. See 18 U.S.C. fj 2257(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). Note the definitions of
producers as primary or secondary as established in the Code of Federal Regulations. See 28 C.F.R. § 75.7(b) (1992) (explaining that, if primary and secondary
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"produces7' as meaning "to produce, manufacture, or publish any book,
magazine, periodical, film, video tape, or other similar matter."95
Additionally, Congress had originally authorized the Attorney General to issue regulations to implement the record-keeping provision^.^^
Following public comments on proposed regulations, the Attorney General included an exemption to the record-keeping requirements that is
particularly relevant in light of the amendments to Section 2257. In the
Code of Federal Regulations Section 75.7, an exemption from the recordkeeping requirements is permitted for depictions of simulated sexually ex'
regulation requires that a statement referring to the
plicit c o n d ~ c t . ~The
exemption be attached to the material.98
The PROTECT Act amended Section 2257's definition of "producesn
to include "computer generated image [s] , digital image [s], or pict u r e [ ~ ] . "It~ further
~
provides that information or evidence obtained or
required by Section 2257 may be used in any child pornography prosecution.loO Previously, such evidence was limited to use solely in prosecutions
for violations of Section 2257. The significance of these changes is discussed below.
A.

The Questionable Constitutionality of the PROTECT Act

The PROTECT Act has narrowed the ban on virtual child pornography to those depictions that are "indistinguishable from that of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct."101 Some commentators have
noted that the "indistinguishable" language will not survive constitutional
attack because it does not remedy the core finding in Free Speech-that the
actual danger from pornography to children is that they are exploited in
its creation.lo2 Nevertheless, a ban on virtually indistinguishable pornography would aid the government's position that it will be unable to prosecute actual pornographers as technology advances. Furthermore, that
rationale may override all other concerns and allow for a ban on virtual
producers are separate, primary producer can delegate duty to affix notice on pornographic materials to secondary producer).
95. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). But cf: 18 U.S.C.
5 2257(h) (3) (2000 & Supp. I11 2003) (adding "computergenerated image, digital
image, or picture" to list of materials).
96. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257(g) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also 18 U.S.C.
§ 2257(g) (2000 & Supp. 111 2003) (maintaining original provision from CPPA).
97. See 28 C.F.R. § 75.7(a)(2). Also exempt are depictions made prior to November 1, 1990, the effective date of the original enactment. See id. § 75.7(a) ( 1 ) .
98. See id. § 75.7(a).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h)(3) (2000 & Supp. 111 2003).
100. See id. § 2257(d) (2).
101. Id. § 2256(8) ( B ) .
102. See, e.g., Feldmeier, supra note 11. See generally Jasmin J. Farhangian,
Comment, A Problem of "Virtual"Proportions: The D@culties Inherent in Tailoring Virtual Child Pornography Laws to Meet Constitutional Standards, 12 J.L. & POL'Y241
(2003).
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pornography that is indistinguishable from actual child pornography. At
this point, however, as acknowledged in the new congressional finding,
technology has not yet reached the point where it can create a completely
virtual child that is indistinguishable from an actual child.lo5 Therefore,
the "indistinguishable from" language bears the same constitutional infirmity that befell the CPPA's "appears to be" language.
In addition to being overbroad, the new "indistinguishable from" language is unconstitutionally vague. Its definition of "indistinguishablen is
linked to an "ordinary" person standard.lo4 Who is the "ordinary" person?
Does it differ from a "reasonable" person? If it is meant to be synonymous
with the latter, other problems arise. The mens rea of Section 2252 is
"knowingly," yet the assessment of whether an image is child pornography
is whether an ordinary person would so think.lo5 Thus, defendants who
do not know that they possess child pornography, where it is in the form
of a virtual image, can be convicted if an ordinary person would believe
the image was of an actual child. In effect, defendants are being convicted
on a negligence standard rather than the "knowingly" mens rea stated in
the statute and mandated by the Supreme Court.'06
defense available to those charged with v i e
The expanded
lating the Act may not survive constitutional scrutiny because, although it
extends to producers, distributors and possessors, it is difficult to see how
anyone other than the producer of virtual pornography would be able to
establish that no actual children were used. As the Free Speech Court reasoned, if the government professes difficulty in establishing that an image
is of an actual child, "it will be at least as difficult for the innocent possesor."^^^ Nevertheless, the majority did not rule out the possibility of an
appropriately drawn affirmative defense.lo8 The PROTECT Act addresses
some of these concerns with the change in the affirmative defense coupled with the changes in the record-keeping requirement. With some revi103. Morphing is child pornography. See 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(8) (C); Timothy J.
Perla, Note, Attempting to End the Cycle of Virtual Pmnography Prohibitions, 83 B.U. L.
REV.1209, 1212 n.10, 1213 11.21 (2003) (affirming CPPA and PROTECT Act's
prohibitions of morphing visuals to appear as though "identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct"). See generally Congressional Findings, supra note
81, 5 501 (5) ("The technology will soon exist . . . to computer generate realistic
images of children.") (emphasis added).
104. 18 U.S.C. 5 2256 states that "the term 'indistinguishable' used with respect to a depiction, means virtually indistinguishable, in that the depiction is such
that an ordina7y person viewing the depiction would conclude that the depiction is
of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. 5 2256(11)
(emphasis added).
105. Compare id. 5 2252, with id. Fj 2256(11).
106. But see United States v. X-Citement Video, lnc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994)
(holding that 5 2252 requires knowledge of both sexually explicit nature of material and age of performers).
107. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 255-56 (2002).
108. See id. at 256.
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sions, the record-keeping provisions can be the cornerstone of legislation
that protects virtual pornographers and actual children.

V. REGULATION
OF THE VIRTUAL
PORNOGRAPHY
~~ARKET
,

,

Since the Supreme Court endorsed virtual pornography as a positive,
a commercial market for virtual pornography could develop. With it, so
could come some of the protections Congress seeks. Certainly, if the Supreme Court is correct and the existence of a virtual pornography market
results in the reduced exploitation of actual children in the creation of
pornography-that could be a positive result, depending on a few crucial
assumptions. First, one would have to accept the Court's contention that
"[flew pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if
fictional, computerized images would
Unfortunately, many experts on child molesters explain that these individuals derive sexual gratification from the pain inflicted on actual children, and the recording of
it."o These producers of child pornography would not be interested in
virtual pornography. Concomitantly, some purveyors of child pornography would also not have their appetites satiated if they knew they were
viewing images of virtual pornography. It is possible, therefore, that only a
small class of pornographers-those who are in it solely for profit-fit the
Free Speech rationale. Whether crimes against actual children will be reduced is yet to be seen.
As discussed in Part Three above, the government faces a great hurdle
in post-Free Speech cases of establishing that defendants knew they possessed
images of actual children. Government regulation of the virtual pornography industry would require labeling of images so as to verify that the
images are virtual. Thus, the labeling provision may ultimately turn out to
be the best method for prosecuting actual child pornographers-those
who produce, distribute and possess child pornography-who would find
it more difficult to claim lack of knowledge. Whether the labeling provisions are effective requires us to examine a number of issues.
Since the Supreme Court declared virtual pornography was protected
expression under the First Amendment, the first issue is whether Section
2257 of the PROTECT Act unduly burdens this right. An examination of
the legislative and judicial history of the original record-keeping provisions provides clear guidance. The original provisions were enacted for
reasons that are strikingly similar (if not virtually identical) to the con-

(I

109. Id. at 254.
110. See A. Nicholas Groth et al., The Child Molester: Clinical Observations, LITICATION AND ADMINSTRATIVE
PRACTICE
COURSE
HANDBOOK
SERIES
CRIMINAL
LAWAND
URBANPROBLEMS,
(Practicing Law Institute),Jan. 27, 1989, at 323 ("Childmolestation is the sexual expression of nonsexual needs and unresolved life issues.");
COURTTV'S CRIMELIBRARY,Child Molestation, ("Molesters engage in sex with children for a variety of reasons and sometimes these reasons have little to do with
sexual desires."), at http://www.crimelibrary.com/criminal~mind/psycholo~/
pedophiles/2. html?sect=19 (last visited Jan. 18, 2005).
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cerns raised by computer-generated images. According to the 1986 Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, which was the catalyst for the
amendments to the original 1984 child pornography legi~lation,~regulations were necessary to stem the use of children in pornographic films and
pictures."* Additionally, the report noted that requiring producers of
pornographic materials to ascertain the ages of the actors they employ
would eliminate claims of mistake or ignorance.ll5
Producers and distributors of adult pornography immediately challenged the record-keeping provisions as unduly burdensome on their First
Amendment rights.l14 Ultimately, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit, in American Libraly Association v. Reno,l l 5 found that the
provisions and related regulations116 were constitutional. In doing so, the
court rejected the plaintiffs' claims that the record-keeping provisions
were content-based; instead, the court ruled that "it is clear that Congress
enacted the Act [The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of
19881 not to regulate the content of sexually explicit materials, but to protect children by deterring the production and distribution of child
pornography."ll
The Reno court further reasoned that content-neutral regulations are
constitutional if narrowly tailored, serve a significant governmental inter~~~
est and leave ample alternative channels of c o m m u n i ~ a t i o n .Applying
that test to the record-keeping provisions, the court noted that they were
narrowly tailored to the prevention of child pornography because they fulfilled three goals:
111. See A m . Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
112. See FINALREPORT, supra note 11, at 618-20 ("Despite the umbrella p r e
tection provided by the Child Protection Act of 1984, loopholes remain that permit the continued exploitation of children.").
113. See id. at 620.
114. SeeAm. Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412 (D.D.C. 1992, affd in part,
rev'd in part, sub nom. A m . Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Am.
Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp. 469 (D.D.C. 1989), vacated by, sub nom.
A m . Library Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
115. 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The Reno court tailored the scope of the
record-keeping provisions by disallowing certain provisions and regulations. See id.
at 90-92. For example, it narrowed the scope of "secondary producers" and invalidated the requirement that producers keep records as long as they remain in business. See id. at 91,93. Later cases further refined the definition of "producer." See
Sundance Assocs., Inc. v. Reno, 139 F.3d 804 (10th Cir. 1998) (clarifying definition
of "producer" under Child Protection and Obscenity Act); see also Connection Distrib. co. v. Reno, 154 F.3d 281, 285-86 (6th Cir. 1998) (same).
116. See 28 C.F.R. § 75 (1992); 57 Fed. Reg. 15017 (1992).
117. Reno, 33 F.3d at 86. The court noted that the goals of the record-keeping
provisions were threefold: first, to prevent the exploitation of children; second, to
deprive child pornographers of access to commercial markets; and third, to aid law
enforcement in identifying the performers in sexually explicit materials to verify
compliance with the law. See id. at 89.
118. See id. at 88.
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It ensures that primary producers actually confirm that a prospective performer is of age; it deters children from attempting
to pass as adults; and most important, it creates the only mechanism by which secondary producers (who by definition have no
contact with performers) can be required to verify the ages of the
individuals pictured in the materials they will be producing.11g
Employing the Reno court's rationale to virtual pornography, the regulation of virtual pornography should survive a constitutional challenge
that it unduly burdens protected speech. The same goals and concerns
apply to underage record-keeping provisions and virtual record-keeping
provisions. In both instances, the goal is to prevent the exploitation of
children. In both situations, the concern is that, without the provisions,
law enforcement is hampered in its ability to prosecute child
pornographers who claim lack of knowledge of the true nature of the
materials produced, distributed or possessed.
The second issue concerning- the language of the newly amended Settion 2257 presents a more difficult constitutional challenge.
The Section
now requires that "whoever produces any book, magazine, periodical,
film, videotape, or other matter which . . . contains one or more visual
depictions . . . of actual sexually explicit conduct," shall create and maintain
records that validate that minors were not used.120 The PROTECT Act
amendments define "produces" to include "computer generated image[^]."'^^
Herein lies the problem that renders the Section constitutionally void
for vagueness: How can someone produce a computer-generated image of
it is computer-generated, or virtual,
"actual sexually explicit conduct?"f
it does not contain actual'conduct.122 The statute does not define "actual
sexually explicit conduct" except to state that it does not include "simulated conduct."123 Moreover, judicial interpretation of the latter term is
scant.lZ4 Notably however, during Senate debates on the PROTECT Act,
Senator Leahy pointed out a similar ambiguity in the proposed new defini-

-

119. Id. at 89.
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a) (1) (2000 & Supp. I11 2003) (emphasis added).
121. Id. § 2257(h) (3) (emphasis added).
122. See 149 CONG.REC. S2573-02, S2578 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) (attacking 2252A and amending it to remove "actual sexually explicit conduct").
123. 18 U.S.C. § 2257(h) (1).
124. See United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024, 1036 (9th Cir. 2003), cert.
h i e d , 124 S.Ct. 2871 (2004) (holding definition of "sexually explicit conduct" including term "simulated" not void for vagueness). CJ United States v. Carroll, 190
F.3d 290, 298 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding that superimposing minor's face on
body of person exhibiting genitals does not violate § 2251 (a), which prohibits defendant from enticing or using minor to engage in actual or simulated sexually
explicit conduct), vacated in part and reinstated in part by, 227 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir.
2000) (per curium). In its opinion, the Carroll court noted that "our search did
not reveal another court's interpretation of the 'simulated . . . lascivious exhibition' language." Id. at 294 n.6 (citation omitted).
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tions of child p ~ r n o g r a p h y . 'Originally,
~~
the statute prohibited visual depictions, including computer-generated images that were
"indistinguishable from that of an actual minor" engaging in sexually ex~~
the definition of "sexually explicit conduct"
plicit ~ 0 n d u c t . lNevertheless,
covered "actual sexual i n t e r c o ~ r s e . " ' ~Senator
~
Leahy stated that he
believed:
[Tlhere is a vagueness concern in the new statute 2252A [enacted as 22561 because, while it is clearly aimed at "virtual" child
pornography (where no real children are involved), it still requires "actual" conduct. In the realm of computer generated
images, however, the distinction between actual and simulated
conduct makes no sense.128
In response, the final version of the statute deleted the term "actual" and
replaced it with the term ''graphi~.'''~~
Thus, the regulation provision as
presently constructed will not withstand constitutional scrutiny because of
its contradictory, and therefore vague, language.
To rectify this ambiguity, Congress should amend Section 2257 to
clarify its requirements with respect to producers of adult pornography
and producers of virtual pornography by creating two separate parts as
illustrated in Appendix One. The proposed Section 2257(1), as appended, should be limited to production of actual sexually explicit conduct involving real actors. The proposed Section 2257(II), as appended,
should be drafted with respect to producers of virtual pornography. Because the creation of virtual pornography does not involve actual individuals, there is no need for the verification requirements in 2257(b). Instead,
the proposed Section 2257(II)(b), as appended, should be created
whereby producers of virtual pornography will record the methods used to
create the virtual images, the specific program and software used, the
names and addresses of the programmers who created the images, the
location of the computer used in the production and the date of creation,
as well as other records necessary to verify that no actual minors were used
in the production.
The regulations promulgated to enforce the record-keeping provision
added an exemption that also needs to be adjusted in light of the amend125. See 149 CONG.REG. S2573-02, S2578 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) (discussing Hatch-Leahy bill provisions that alter definition of
"child pornography").
126. See id. at S2575 (detailing amendments to 18 U.S.C. § 2256).
127. Id. (emphasis added). The definition also covered "lascivious simulated
sexual intercoursen. Id.
128. Id. at S2581. Senator Leahy stressed that he fears "clever defendants
might seek to argue that this new provision still requires proof [of] 'actual' sexual
acts involving real children." Id.
129. See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2) (B) (i) (2004) (defining characteristics of "sexually explicit conductn).
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ments to Section 2257.130 Under the Code of Federal Regulations Section
75.7, depictions of simulated sexually explicit conduct are exempt from
the record-keeping requirements.13' This regulation directly conflicts
with Congress's intent to extend the record-keeping requirement to creators of virtual pornography.13* Therefore, the regulation must be
changed t o eliminate t h e exemption for simulated sexually explicit conduct created by computer techn01ogy.l~~
T h e new record-keeping provision states that evidence o r information
obtained from the mandated records can now be used in the prosecution
of any child pornography offense, rather than just labeling offenses.134
This significantly expands the scope of Section 2257, which previously limited the use of information o r evidence obtained from the records only to
prosecutions for violating the record-keeping provision.135 T h e impetus
for the original record-keeping legislation-the Attorney General's Commission o n Pornography-stated
that the information contained in the
records should n o t b e used in pornography prosecutions so as t o avoid
Fifth Amendment self-incrimination concerns.ls6 Congress obeyed, thus
precluding any judicial o r scholarly examination of the issue.13' T h e self130. For a discussion of the record-keeping requirements on producers of
pornography, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
131. See 28 C.F.R. 5 75.7(a) (2) (2004) (providing exemption for record-keep
ing requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 2257(a)-(c) (2004)).
132. See 149 CONG.k c . S2573-02, S2584 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) (statement
of Sen. Hatch) (discussing new provisions of PROTECT Act). Senator Hatch
noted that the new record-keeping "expands the scope of materials covered to
reflect the computerized manner in which they are increasingly being distributed
and sold. Producers of such sexually explicit materials must make and maintain
records confirming that no actual minors were involved in the making of the sexually explicit materials." See id.
133. Simulated sexually explicit conduct using actual adults would still be subject to the existing exemption. For example, images merely suggesting off camera
sexual activity would be exempt. See Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 1990,57 Fed. Reg. 15,017,15,019(Apr. 24,1992) (codified at
28 C.F.R. pt. 75).
134. 149 CONG.REc. S2573-02, S2578 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 2003) ("These
records, which will be helpful in proving that the material in question is not 'virtual' child pornography, may be used in federal child pornography and obscenity
prosecutions under this Act.").
135. Id. (noting need for changed record-keeping requirements).
136. See FINALREPORT, supra note 11, at 621 (stating that information in
records should not be used in prosecution so as to avoid Fifth Amendment
problems).
137. To the contrary, initial challenges to Section 2257's constitutionality asserted that it was not narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest
because the evidence could not be used in a child pornography prosecution. See
Amer. Library Ass'n v. Barr, 794 F. Supp. 412, 417 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that Act
applies to all depictions of actual sexually explicit conduct regardless of age or
apparent age of model), affd in part, rev'd i n part, sub nom. Am. Library Ass'n v.
Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (upholding requirement to hold records for
minimum of five years but struck down requirement to hold records indefinitely);
h e r . Library Ass'n v. Thornburgh, 713 F. Supp 469,478 (D.D.C. 1989) (d'ISCUSSHeinonline - - 50 Vill. L. Rev. 106 2005

incrimination concerns were revived in Senate debates on the PROTECT
Act's amendment to Section 2257 enlarging its scope.138 The resultant
expanded scope now demands an examination of such self-incrimination
issues.
The Fifth Amendment states that a person cannot be compelled to
incriminate him or herself.lS9 Yet, the privilege against self-incrimination
is not absolute. In two related areas, the courts have demarcated limitations on the privilege. The first concerns records that the government
requires of those engaged in a regulated industry. Such "required
records" are not privileged even if they may incriminate the recordkeeper.140 This doctrine limits the right against self-incrimination if three
criteria are met. First, the documents must be kept for an "essentially regulatory" purpose; second, the records must be of; kind that the regulated
party has customarily kept; and third, the records have assumed public
aspects, which make them analogous to public records.l4I
In the seminal case Shapiro v. United States,14* the defendant, a wholesaler of produce during- World War 11, was subject to the record-keeping
provisions of the Emergency Price Control Act, which required him to
record price, sale and delivery inf0rmati0n.l~~
The defendant claimed his
privilege against self-incrimination after being ordered to produce his
In rejecting the defenrecords and prosecuted for violating the
dant's constitutional claim, the supreme Court noted-that the congressional intent behind the record-keeping provision was to aid law
enforcement, and therefore, Congress could not have intended to make
ing constitutional problems with Section 2257) vacated by, sub nom. Am. Library
Ass'n v. Barr, 956 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1992); see also Amer. Library Ass'n v. Reno,
47 F.3d 1215, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating there is serious
risk that Section 2257 burdens substantially more speech than necessary). Presumably the expanded scope of the amended Section 2257 allays this concern.
138. See 148 CONG.REc. S 11,199, 11,204 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2002) (statement
of Sen. Leahy) ("[Rlequiring producers to maintain records at the risk of criminal
liability for not doing so, which records can be used against them in a child pornography prosecution, violates the constitutional prohibition against mandatory
self-incrimination.").
139. SeeU.S. CONST.amend V ("[Nlor shall be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself. . . .").
140. See generally, Bernard D. Meltzer, Required Records, the McCarran Act, and
the Privilege Against Self-lnm'mination, 18 U. CHI. L. REV. 687 (1951) (discussing required records doctrine and effect on constitutional privilege against self-incrimination); Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its LRssons for the
Pn'vilege Against Self-lcrimination, 53 U. CHI.L. REV. 6 (1986) (same).
141. See Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1968) (detailing premises of required records doctrine). See generally Jeremy Hugh Temkin, "Hollow Ritual[~]":The Fz$h Amendment and SelfRepwting Schemes, 34 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1986)
(discussing required records doctrine and self-incrimination).
142. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
143. See id. at 4 (noting defendant's occupation and his required federal
records).
144. See id. at 5 (stating that defendant produced records, but claimed constitutional privilege).
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them ~ r i v i 1 e g e d . lThe
~ ~ majority reasoned that documents required to be
~~
Frankfurter diskept for the public benefit were not ~ r i v i 1 e g e d . IJustice
sented on the grounds that the mere requirement that records be kept
does not make them public records that are outside the scope of Fifth
Amendment protection.147 He stressed that for records to be exempt
from constitutional protection, the public should have "the same right
that the Government has to peruse [these records], if not to use,
them."148
Recently, in Environmmtal Defense Fund, Inc. v. L~rnphier,'~~
the defendant argued that compelling him to notify the EPA of hazardous waste
activities and requiring him to obtain a permit for those activities forced
him to make incriminating disclosures in violation of the Fifth Arnendment.I5O The Fourth Circuit rejected this contention, and ruled that the
regulatory scheme set up by Congress to monitor the hazardous waste industry was not to outlaw the hazardous waste business, but rather to bring
people into compliance.151 Making an analogy to Shapiro, the court
noted, "records required as part of a valid regulatory scheme (as opposed
to a ploy to entrap gamblers, drug dealers, etc.) are not barred o n fifth
amendment grounds even though they may contain incriminating
information.n152
Closely related to, but distinct from, the required records doctrine are
self-reporting requirements. These statutory schemes require individuals
to provide information to the government. The extent to which the government can use such information against the provider also implicates the
privilege against self-incrimination.
In three cases decided on the same day and known as the "trilogy,"
the Supreme Court attempted to delineate the scope of the privilege in
self-reporting cases.153 The Court determined that where the activity for
145. See id. at 15 (stating that Congress's intent was to aid effective enforcement of record-keeping requirements and did not intend private privilege to
attach).
146. See id. at 32-33 (concluding that privilege of private papers cannot be
maintained for documents "which are the appropriate subjects of governmental
regulation" (quoting Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 589-90 (1946))).
147. See id. at 51 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("If records merely because required to be kept by law ips0 facto become public records, we are indeed living in
glass houses.").
148. Id. at 55 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
149. 714 F.2d 331 (4th Cir. 1983).
150. See id. at 339 (stating Lamphier's constitutional argument).
151. See id. ("In passing RCRA [Resource Conservation and Recovery Act],
Congress did not outlaw the hazardous waste business; it merely set up a regulatory
program for monitoring those activities.").
152. Id.
153. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (examining whether
wagering tax statutes' registration requirements violated defendant's Fifth Arnendment privilege against self-incrimination); Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62,
63-64 (1968) (same); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968) (analyzing
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which records were sought was essentially criminal, the self-incrimination
privilege prevailed. In Marchetti v. United States,154 the defendant was a
professional gambler, who failed to comply with Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) requirements that he supply the IRS with information about his
gambling activities.155 The defendant failed to supply the information or
to pay the requisite excise and occupational taxes on his wagering activities.156 In challenging his convictions for income tax evasion, Mr.
Marchetti argued that the self-reporting requirement violated his right
against self-incrimination.15' The Supreme Court agreed by reasoning
that, because gambling was illegal in all but one jurisdiction, the defendant would be required to admit criminal behavior by filling out the
form.158 The Court distinguished Shapiro by stressing that reporting requirements in "'an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of interest"' do not violate the right against self-incrimination, whereas the
gambling regulation was incriminatory because it was targeting "a selective
group inherently suspect of criminal a~tivities."'~~
Thus, the Supreme Court developed parallel lines of cases concerning the keeping of required records and self-reporting provisions. Commentators have noted the distinction between the two and the differing
Nevertheless, in the
test for determining Fifth Amendment pr0b1ems.l~~
whether firearm registration requirements violated defendant's Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
154. 390 U.S. 39 (1968). For a discussion of the protections offered by the
Fifth Amendment, see supra notes 139-41 and accompanying text.
155. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 40-41.
156. See id.
157. See id. at 41 (noting defendant's argument that "statutory obligations to
register and pay occupational tax violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination").
158. See id. at 44-49 (stating that "petitioner's assertion of the privilege as a
defense to this prosecution was entirely proper, and accordingly should have sufficed to prevent his conviction"). Similarly, Grosso involved a gambler who failed to
comply with income tax statutes. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 63-64. H a y w concerned
the failure to self-report a firearm purchase. See Hayws, 390 U.S. at 85.
159. See Marchetti, 390 U.S. at 57 (quoting Alberston v. Subversive Activities
Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965)). Alberston involved a self-reporting scheme directed at members of the Communist Party, which the Supreme Court struck down
because it was targeting a selective group "inherently suspect of criminal activities."
Alberston v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965). For a discussion of Marchetti, see Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Larnphier, 714 F.2d 331, 339 (4th Cir.
1983) ("[Wlhile reporting requirements in 'an essentially noncriminal and regulatory area of inquiry' are permissible despite the possibility of incidental self-incrimination, an inquiry directed to a 'selective group inherently suspect of
criminal activities' is not.").
160. See Temkin, supra note 141, at 467 n.2 (discussing distinction between
required records and self-reporting provisions); see also Abraham Abramovsky,
Monqr Laundering and Narcotics Prosecution, 54 FORDHAM
L. REV. 471, 495-97 (1986)
(discussing line of cases where Supreme Court addressed Fifth Amendment privilege in self-reporting context); Irene Merker Rosenberg, Bouknight: Of Abused
Children and the Parental Privilege Against Self-nm'mination, 76 IOWAL. REV. 535,
540-47 (1991) (same).
Heinonline - - 50 Vill. L. Rev. 109 2005

[Vol. 50: p. 87
initial congressional reports and hearings on the record-keeping provisions, it appears that Congress was relying too heavily on the self-reporting
line of cases.161 In believing that Section 2257 was governed not by the
required records line of cases, but instead by the self-reporting cases, the
original record-keeping provisions unduly limited the evidentiary use of
the information obtained by the records to find violations of Section 2257.
The PROTECT Act's amendment expansion is permissible because
the record-keeping provisions here do not deal with an "essentially criminal" activity such as gambling. Under the Shapiro line of cases, Section
2257 will survive constitutional scrutiny by satisfying the three established
criteria. The first requirement is that the records must be kept for an
"essentially regulatory" purpose.16* Here, because producers of virtual
pornography are within their constitutional rights to engage in that activity, the records they must keep are essentially regulatory. If producers
comply with the record-keeping and labeling provisions, they are within
their rights to produce the pornography-unlike the Marchetti petitioner,
who risked gambling prosecutions because of the self-reporting
requirements.
The second requirement is that the records must be of the kind the
regulated party has customarily kept.163 Because the field of virtual pornography is so new, we cannot say that this criterion is met per se. Nevertheless, we can see that the industry is already accustomed to keeping
records of the actors employed in its productions by making an analogy to
the record-keeping requirement for the producers of adult pornography.164 Requiring records that document the means used to create underage virtual pornography should not be problematic.
The third requirement is that the records must have public asp e c t ~ . Justice
' ~ ~ Frankfurter's criteria in his Shapiro dissent highlights Section 2257s constitutionality with respect to this criterion-because the
labeling would be required to be posted on all productions, it is certainly
available to the public.
Producers and distributors of virtual pornography should have no objection to such labeling because it would allow them to exercise their First
Amendment rights and protect them from unwarranted prosecution. The
government would benefit from the labeling because it would be easier to
prove that defendants knew they possessed actual child pornography if the
images did not include a virtual pornography label. Moreover, it would
ease the evidentiary burden of establishing that an image was of an actual
161. See H.R. Doc. No. 100-129, at 55-106 (1987) (providing analysis of proposed Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1987 (citing Marchetti
and Albertson)) .
162. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 67-68 (stating first requirement).
163. See id. at 68 (stating second requirement).
164. For a discussion of record-keeping requirements for producers of pornography, see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
165. See Grosso, 390 U.S. at 68 (stating third requirement).
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child. Concomitantly, the record-keeping provision would aid the possessors of alleged child pornography in establishing their &rmative defense
that the images they possessed were completely virtual. They can buttress
this claim by introducing into evidence the label required by 2257 that
states that the images are of adults or are completely computer-generated.

VI. CONCLUSION
As the post-Free Speech child pornography cases illustrate, the government must prove two elements: first, that a pornographic image is of an
actual child, and second, that the defendant had knowledge of the authenticity of the image.166 Protecting actual children and the rights of virtual
pornographers can be accomplished by using the record-keeping provisions, as modified according to the suggestions made above. If the Supreme Court is correct in its assessment that a virtual pornography market
is desirable, then images generated by producers of virtual pornography
will all contain the record-keeping label. Accordingly, those seeking constitutionally protected images will come to rely on the labe1.16' Concomitantly, the lack of a label can be used in a prosecution as evidence that the
defendant knew he was dealing with actual child pornography. Thus, the
best defense against child pornography may be to embrace virtual
pornography.

166. For a discussion of the government's burden of proof in post-Free Speech
child pornography cases, see supra notes 40-80 and accompanying text.
167. If a producer of child pornography falsely affixes a statement that the
images are virtual, this analysis fails, but then so does the Supreme Court's premise
that virtual pornography will dry up the market for actual child pornography.
H e i n o n l i n e - - 5 0 V i l l . L. R e v .

111 2 0 0 5

[Vol. 50: p. 87
APPENDIX

MODEL STATUTE (Additions or amendments in italics)
§ 2257. Record keeping requirements

( a ) Who= produces any book, magazine, periodical, film, vi&otape, or picture or
other matter of actual individuals which(I) contains one or more visual depictions ma& after November 1, 1990 of
actual sexualiy explicit conduct; and
(2) is produced in whole or in part with materials which have been
mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or is
shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or transportation in interstate or foreign commerce;
shall create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining
to every performer portrayed in such a visual depiction.
(b) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall, with respect to every
performer portrayed in a visual depiction of actual sexually explicit
conduct(1) ascertain, by examination of an identification document containing such information, the performer's name and date of birth,
and require the performer to provide such other indicia of his or
her identity as may be prescribed by regulations;
(2) ascertain any name, other than the performer's present and correct name, ever used by the performer including maiden name,
alias, nickname, stage, or professional name; and
(3) record in the records required by subsection (a) the information
required by paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection and such
other identifying information as may be prescribed by regulation.
(c) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall maintain the records
required by this section at his business premises, or at such other
place as the Attorney General may by regulation prescribe and shall
make such records available to the Attorney General for inspection at
all reasonable times.
(dl
(1) No information or evidence obtained from records required to
be created o r maintained by this section shall, except as provided
in this section, directly or indirectly, be used as evidence against
any person with respect to any violation of law.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not preclude the use of
such information or evidence in a prosecution or other action for
a violation of this chapter or chapter 71 [18 USCS $5 2251 et seq.
or 1460 et seq.], or for a violation of any applicable provision of
law with respect to the furnishing of false information.
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(1) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall cause to be affixed to every copy of any matter described in paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) of this section, in such manner and in such form as
the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, a statement
describing where the records required by this section with respect
to all performers depicted in that copy of the matter may be
located.
(2) If the person to whom subsection (a) of this section applies is an
organization the statement required by this subsection shall include the name, title, and business address of the individual employed by such organization responsible for maintaining the
records required by this section.
(f) It shall be unlawful(1) for any person to whom subsection (a) applies to fail to create or
maintain the records as required by subsections (a) and (c) or by
any regulation promulgated under this section;
(2) for any person to whom subsection (a) applies knowingly to make
any false entry in or knowingly to fail to make an appropriate entry in, any record required by subsection (b) of this section o r any
regulation promulgated under this section;
(3) for any person to whom subsection (a) applies knowingly to fail to
comply with the provisions of subsection (e) or any regulation
promulgated pursuant to that subsection; and
(4) for any person knowingly to sell or otherwise transfer, or offer for
sale or transfer, any book, magazine, periodical, film, video, or
other matter, produce in whole or in part with materials which
have been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce or
which is intended for shipment in interstate o r foreign commerce,
which(A) contains one or more visual depictions made after the effective date of this subsection of actual sexually explicit conduct;
and
(B) is produced in whole or in part with materials which have
been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or
is shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or
transportation in interstate or foreign commerce;
which does not have affixed thereto, in a manner prescribed as set
forth in subsection ( e ) ( l ) , a statement describing where the
records required by this section may be located, but such person
shall have no duty to determine the accuracy of the contents of
the statement or the records required to be kept.
(g) The Attorney General shall issue appropriate regulations to carry out
this section.
(h) As used in this sectionH e i n o n l i n e - - 5 0 V i l l . L. R e v .
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(1) the term "actual sexually explicit conduct" means actual but not
simulated conduct as defined in subparagraphs (A) through (D)
of paragraph (2) of section 2256 of this title;
(2) "identification document" has the meaning given that term in
section 1028(d) of this title;
(3) the term "produces" means to produce, manufacture, or publish any book,
magazine, periodical, film, video tape, picture, or other similar matter involving actual individuals and includes the duplication, reproduction, or reissuing of any such matter, but does not include mere
distribution or any other activity which does not involve hiring,
contracting for managing, or otherwise arranging for the participation of the performers depicted; and
(4) the term "performer" includes any person portrayed in a visual
depiction engaging in, or assisting another person to engage in,
actual sexually explicit conduct.
(i) Whoever violates this section shall be imprisoned for not more than 5
years, and fined in accordance with the provisions of this title, or both.
Whoever violates this section after having been convicted of a violation
punishable under this section shall be imprisoned for any period of
years not more than 10 years but not less than 2 years, and fined in
accordance with the provisions of this title, or both.

(a) Whoever produces by computer, digital or other similar means wholly virtual
images:
( I ) contains one or more visual depictions ma& after November 1, 1990 of
sexually explicit conduct; and
(2) is produced in whole or i n part with materials which have been mailed or
shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or is shipped or transported or is
intended for shipment or transportation in interstate or f d g n commerce;
shall create and maintain individually identifiable records pertaining to
e v q image pmtrayed in such a visual depiction.
(6) "Whoever produces any image covered u n h this subsection shall affix to the
production a statement that the images were completely created by computer and
that no image of any actual minor was used in its production. The producer
shall keep records of the methods used to create the virtual images, incluok the
speczfic program and software used, the names and addresses of the programmers who created the images, the location of the computer used in the Poduction, the date of creation and other records necessary to vmilj that no actual
minors were used in the production."
(c) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall maintain the records
required by this section at his business premises, or at such other
place as the Attorney General may by regulation prescribe and shall
make such records available to the Attorney General for inspection at
all reasonable times.
(d)
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(1) No information or evidence obtained from records required to
be created or maintained by this section shall, except as provided
in this section, directly or indirectly, be used as evidence against
any person with respect to any violation of law.
(2) Paragraph (1) of this subsection shall not preclude the use of
such information or evidence in a prosecution or other action for
a violation of this chapter or chapter 71 [18 USCS §§ 2251 et seq.
or 1460 et seq.], or for a violation of any applicable provision of
law with respect to the furnishing of false information.
(el
(1) Any person to whom subsection (a) applies shall cause to be affixed to every copy of any matter described in paragraph (1) of
subsection (a) of this section, in such manner and in such form as
the Attorney General shall by regulations prescribe, a statement
describing where the records required by this section with respect
to all images depicted in that copy of the matter may be located.
(2) If the person to whom subsection (a) of this section applies is an
organization the statement required by this subsection shall include the name, title, and business address of the individual employed by such organization responsible for maintaining the
records required by this section.
(f) It shall be unlawful(1) for any person to whom subsection I1 (a) applies to fail to create
or maintain the records as required by subsections (a) and (c) or
by any regulation promulgated under this section;
(2) for any person to whom subsection II(a) applies knowingly to
make any false entry in or knowingly to fail to make an appropriate entry in, any record required by subsection (b) of this section
or any regulation promulgated under this section;
(3) for any person to whom subsection II(a) applies knowingly to fail
to comply with the provisions of subsection (e) or any regulation
promulgated pursuant to that subsection; and
(4) for any person knowingly to sell or otherwise transfer, or offer for
sale or transfer, any book, magazine, periodical, film, video, or
other matter, produce in whole or in part with materials which
have been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce o r
which is intended for shipment in interstate or foreign commerce,
which(A) contains one or more visual depictions made after the effective date of this subsection of actual sexually explicit conduct;
and
(B) is produced in whole or in part with materials which have
been mailed or shipped in interstate or foreign commerce, or
is shipped or transported or is intended for shipment or
transportation in interstate o r foreign commerce;
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which does not have &xed thereto, in a manner prescribed as set
forth in subsection (e) (1), a statement describing where the
records required by this section may be located, but such person
shall have no duty to determine the accuracy of the contents of
the statement or the records required to be kept.
(g) The Attorney General shall issue appropriate regulations to carry out
this section.
(h) As used in this section( I ) the tenn "sexually explicit conduct" means simulated conduct as defined
in subparagraphs (A) through (D) of paragraph (2)of section 2256 of this
tith;
(2) "identification document" has the meaning given that term in
section 1028(d) of this title;
(3) the term "poduces" means to poduce, manufacture, m publish any computer generated, digital, or other similar matter and includes the duplication, reproduction, or reissuing of any such matter, but does
not include mere distribution or any other activity which does not
involve hiring, contracting for managing, or otherwise arranging
for the participation of the performers depicted; and
(i) Whoever violates this section shall be imprisoned for not more than 5
years, and fined in accordance with the provisions of this title, or both.
Whoever violates this section after having been convicted of a violation
punishable under this section shall be imprisoned for any period of
years not more than 10 years but not less than 2 years, and fined in
accordance with the provisions of this title, or both.
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